

The implications of the Russian-Ukrainian war on world food security indicators



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Abstract

The Russian-Ukrainian war has become a concern for the global economy, according to various estimates by research centers and institutions concerned with assessing the global economic situation, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, among others, which have issued numerous reports predicting a crisis characterized primarily by a decline in global food security indicators due to the war, especially in poorer countries that heavily rely on the warring parties for importing many essential commodities for their food security.

Therefore, this study aims to examine the implications of the Russian-Ukrainian war on global food security by conducting a study and analysis of various indicators of global food security related to Russian and Ukrainian production, supply, and exports to countries around the world. The goal is to understand the reality of these indicators before and after the war in order to uncover the extent of change and the existing and potential risks to global food security in light of this war.

Keywords

The Russian war;
Food security index;
Ukrainian exports;
Global food production;

الكلمات المفتاحية

كلمة مفتاحية؛
الحرب الروسية؛
مؤشر الغذاء؛
الصادرات الأوكرانية؛
الإنتاج العالمي للغذاء.

انعكاسات الحرب الروسية الأوكرانية على مؤشرات الأمن الغذائي العالمي

ملخص

شكلت الحرب الروسية الأوكرانية هاجس للاقتصاد العالمي، وفق التقديرات المختلفة لمراكز البحوث والمؤسسات المعنية بتقديرات الطرف الاقتصادي العالمي كالبنك الدولي، وصندوق النقد الدولي..... إلخ والتي أصدرت عديد التقارير التي تنبئ بحدوث أزمة متمثلة أساسا في تراجع مؤشرات الأمن الغذائي العالمي جراء الحرب وخاصة في الدول الفقيرة التي تعتمد أساسا على طرفي الحرب في استيراد العديد من السلع الأساسية لأمنها الغذائي. وعليه تسعى هذه الدراسة إلى البحث في تداعيات الحرب الروسية الأوكرانية على الأمن الغذائي العالمي من خلال الوقوف على دراسة وتحليل المؤشرات المختلفة للأمن الغذائي العالمي المرتبطة بالإنتاج والتوريد والتصدير الروسي الأوكراني اتجاه دول العالم، قصد معرفة واقع هذه المؤشرات قبل وبعد الحرب للكشف عن مقدار التغيير والمخاطر الواقعة والمحتملة على الأمن الغذائي العالمي في ظل هذه الحرب.

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I. Introduction

The Russian-Ukrainian war, which erupted on February 24, 2022, has posed a threat to the global economy due to its wide-ranging possibilities, estimations, and potential impacts on indicators of global food production, availability, and movement.

The parties involved in the conflict, being among the largest producers and suppliers of various food commodities relied upon by many countries in Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, as well as coastal and sub-Saharan African nations, have raised concerns about the disruption in production caused by the war, the paralysis of shipping ports, economic sanctions imposed by Western countries on Russia, the Russian economic blockade on Ukrainian exports, and Russia's withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Agreement. These factors are expected to have a significant impact on global food indicators.

Consequently, this study aims to investigate the actual and potential repercussions of the Russian-Ukrainian war on global food indicators by examining and analyzing its effects on the food production of both Russia and Ukraine, especially those commodities that hold important positions in the global economy. Additionally, it aims to compare various indicators related to global supply and export movements from Ukraine and Russia before and after the outbreak of the war between the two countries.

Research Problem:

This study seeks to address the following research problem:

To what extent does the Russian-Ukrainian war affect global food indicators?

To address this issue, the study will address its most important variables through the following plan:

1. Introduction
2. .Background and Causes of the Russian-Ukrainian War:
 - 1.Historical Background
 - 2 . the political background:
 - 3 . Economic Background
3. International Standing of Russia and Ukraine in Global Food Indicators:..
 1. Russia's Position in the Global Food Index:
 - 2.Ukraine's Position in the Global Food Index
4. The Implications of the Russian-Ukrainian War on Global Food Security:
 1. the impact on food production
 2. the impact on food prices in the global market
 - 3.the impact on global food exports
5. .Conclusion

II. _Background and Causes of the Russian-Ukrainian War:

The background of the Russian-Ukrainian war is closely linked to the geopolitical and geostrategic significance of Ukraine for Russia, both historically and in terms of economy, politics, and security. Ukraine represents a crucial zone of influence and a gateway for securing Russian national security against threats emanating from the West. Therefore, the tension between Russia and Ukraine is often associated with the competition and tug-of-war between Moscow and Western powers to attract the loyalty of Ukrainian elites and ruling leadership.

1 .Historical Background:

Historically, Ukraine has been a chessboard in international politics and a battleground for competition and conflict between Russia and neighboring Western powers. From the perspective of Russian decision-makers, Ukraine holds a historical significance as it represents a legacy of the Russian past, being the third-largest republic of the former Soviet Union. Western powers also view Ukraine as an advanced defensive line for isolating and weakening Russian power.

Throughout history, Ukraine has been a historical gateway for mutual security threats between the East and the West. For instance, in 1812, Napoleon Bonaparte's forces invaded Moscow via Ukraine, and during World War II (1942), German forces led by Hitler invaded the Soviet Union and reached Stalingrad (currently Volgograd) through Ukraine. Furthermore, Soviet forces also invaded Central and Western Europe through Ukraine.

Therefore, understanding the background of the Russian-Ukrainian war requires examining the moves of both Russia and Western powers to solidify their relations with Ukraine. Thus, the tension between the two neighboring countries is

often driven by Ukraine's Western aspirations, which began to materialize in May 2004 when Ukraine took its first practical steps towards full membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Then Ukrainian Minister of Security, Yevhen Marchuk, stated, "There is no future for Ukraine if it remains outside NATO" (rassoul,2018, p14). This pursuit, if realized, would encircle Russia and provide NATO countries with a justification for joint action to deter any Russian moves towards Ukraine in the event of its acceptance of membership. Article 5 of the NATO Charter states that "an armed attack against one or more of them [member countries]...shall be considered an attack against them all." Thus, these countries agree that in the event of an armed attack, each of them will assist, in the exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense, as recognized within Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.(north atlantic treaty,2022).

The 2004 presidential elections serve as a prime example of the competition between Russia and the West and their investment in the internal situation in Ukraine to sway the ruling elite. These elections reflected an internal oligarchic conflict in Ukraine resulting from a clash of two different wills representing external projects. The first was the Russian project, supporting Yanukovych's aspirations for closer relations with Russia, which found extensive support in the eastern regions of Ukraine. The second was the Western project, supporting Yushchenko's integration into the Euro-Atlantic institutional framework, which enjoyed support in the western regions of the country (rassoul,2018,p23-24).

The Ukrainian crisis erupted in 2013 when Yanukovych suspended preparations for implementing the partnership agreement with the European Union. This was followed by demonstrations and protests between separatists and Ukrainian forces, leading to the ousting of President Yanukovych on February 22, 2014. Subsequently, pro-Russian armed groups took control of government buildings in the Crimean Peninsula. The Russian parliament approved Putin's request on March 1, 2014, to use Russian forces in Ukraine. Later, a law was enacted on March 21, 2014, officially annexing the Crimean Peninsula to Russia (Walker, 2022, p 06).

Events continued to unfold until the West achieved a resounding victory in gaining the allegiance of Ukraine's ruling elite by electing Volodymyr Zelensky as President on April 21, 2019. Zelensky agreed on September 14, 2020, to the new Ukrainian strategy for national security, aiming to join NATO (Walker, 2022, p 06). This reignited tensions between Ukraine and Russia, leading Russia to make necessary military preparations by amassing Russian forces on the Ukrainian border. Furthermore, Russia presented a security list to resolve the crisis regarding Ukraine, including a legally binding guarantee that Ukraine would never accept NATO membership and the latter's abstention from any military activity in Eastern Europe and Ukraine (Walker, 2022, p 06).

On February 10, 2022, Russia launched what is called the largest military exercise since the Cold War and held joint maneuvers with Belarus near the Ukrainian border.

Following this, Russian President Putin acknowledged the independence of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics, a day before the announcement of military operations against Ukraine. Then, on the early morning of February 24, 2022, in a televised address, Putin declared that Russian forces would carry out special military operations in Ukraine(Walker, 2022, p 06).

2. the political background:

The administrations of both President Biden of the United States and President Putin of Russia have adopted actions and strategies that contribute to increasing tensions between the East and the West, culminating in Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 24, 2022. The Biden administration has worked on reevaluating U.S. military deployment plans worldwide, particularly in regions where containment of both Russia and China can be achieved. The following are some of the steps taken:

A. Redeployment in Europe and the Mediterranean: On March 8, 2021, a group of American ships entered the Mediterranean Sea through the Strait of Gibraltar, belonging to the U.S. Sixth Fleet. At the end of February 2021, the United States deployed units from the 1st Infantry Division, within the Combat Aviation Brigade, at the port of Alexandroupolis in northern Greece, to participate in the work of the U.S. Air Forces in support of Europe and Africa, responsible for U.S. aviation assets in the region, in implementation of the U.S.-European Joint Decision regarding Russian presence in Ukraine, named "Atlantic Resolve Operation." The deployment includes 30 helicopters participating in exercises for the benefit of Romania in March 2021.

Washington has also deployed dozens of military helicopters and decided to expand four military bases in Greece, allocating naval bases for U.S. forces as part of a defense agreement between the two countries. The U.S. used 145 helicopters and hundreds of military vehicles in the "Defender-Europe 2021" maneuvers, in addition to arrangements related to joint exercises with Greece in western Thrace. In the same context, the United States began establishing a presence in the Black Sea, conducting joint exercises with Turkey in the Black Sea and with Greece in the Aegean Sea, as part of preparations to secure the Balkans and the Black Sea regions, alongside developing the U.S. vision for the region after the trilateral meeting that included Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey to develop Romania's combat capabilities through combat helicopters, which were previously deployed to Alexandroupolis.

Washington, together with Greece and several NATO members, participated in the Crete exercises in January 2021, the "Eastern Thrace" exercises on February 22, 2021, the "Aegean Sea" exercises on March 13, 2021, and the "Iniochos" exercises in April 2021. It also conducted exercises with Turkey in the Black Sea on February 10, 2021, and in the Eastern Mediterranean on March 17, 2021.

B. Redeployment in the Pacific and Indian Oceans: The decision to deploy the USS Rafael Peralta destroyer alongside the USS Ronald Reagan aircraft carrier and the USS Blue Ridge command ship in the port of Yokosuka, Japan, indicates

that the United States attaches great importance to the region where the Pacific and Indian Oceans converge. The United States is facing China in a struggle for influence in the region, and Europe is also increasing its presence in the Pacific Ocean by deploying the United Kingdom's aircraft carrier, the Queen Elizabeth. Germany is considering sending a war frigate to Japan, which means that containing China is becoming a growing concern in Western decision-making circles.

C. Redeployment in the Arabian Gulf: President Joe Biden ordered the withdrawal of some US forces from the Gulf region and a reorganization of US military concentration in other areas. The key pieces that were withdrawn included three Patriot missile batteries with their crews from the Gulf, which were redeployed in the Caucasus. The Pentagon announced that this redeployment aims to contribute to efforts to contain both Russia and China without diverting US forces from more vital areas for American interests. The United States has kept the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense systems in place to ensure the defense of Saudi Arabia against ballistic missiles.

The US administration also announced its plans to withdraw more than one-third of its forces in Iraq while maintaining forces to provide advice and assistance to Iraqi security forces.

As for Russia, from 2008 to 2021, Putin adopted what he called the "strategy of restoring influence and status," which involved waging a comprehensive hybrid war on all fronts. This strategy operated on several levels, including:

A. A wide-scale offensive cyber war, where Russia established an internet army and electronic brigades to disseminate Russian messages and content through social media platforms and conducted secret and intensive cyber campaigns against some Western countries. This necessitated the development of Russian capabilities in the areas of cyber espionage, surveillance, interception, and hacking, among other related sectors.

B. Direct or indirect Russian military interventions, as seen in Georgia in 2008, Ukraine in 2014, and Syria in 2015, involving the use of Russian military forces, elements from Chechnya, or the Russian private military company Wagner.

C. Strengthening alliances, either through activating the Collective Security Treaty, as Russian forces intervened to suppress popular protests against Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in January 2022, or by forging strategic agreements with major opponents of the United States, such as China through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

These alliances are also reinforced through strong mutual interests with US allies in the Western alliance, such as Germany and France, exchanging military technology and field agreements in Syria with Israel, sharing influence with Turkey in various common dialogue files, supporting Iran in its regional and nuclear issues, and pursuing a new strategy in Africa through Wagner Group forces while adopting an arms diplomacy with Egypt and some Gulf Arab states.

D - The rapid development of digital armament technology is achieved through integrating new technologies to enhance the capabilities of existing weapon systems. This includes the announcement of a series of nuclear-capable weapon programs to ensure the ability to penetrate US missile defense systems, as well as the development of systems capable of attacking or disabling satellites.

The development also involves enhancing Russian capabilities in artificial intelligence technology, disrupting and destroying enemy command and control systems and communication capabilities. Additionally, there is a strategy to establish a massive Bitcoin mining operation in Kazakhstan to reduce the influence of the US dollar on the global economy.

3. Economic Background

The Ukrainian geography is characterized by a crucial set of geographic features that have made it a strategically competitive region on both international and regional levels. This is considered an important economic background for Russia in its war against Ukraine, as invading Ukraine indirectly weakens Western countries that rely on Ukraine for their food supply. The importance of Ukraine can be summarized as follows :

It is located between the former Soviet Union with its communist past and Slavic identity on one hand, and Western European countries with liberal and Westernized ideologies on the other. This makes Ukraine subject to various conflicting cultural influences.

Ukraine is geographically positioned on the Black Sea, which is a partially open sea and serves as an outlet to access warm waters.

Ukrainian geography serves as a significant trade route between Russia and European countries, especially as a crucial transit point for Russian energy transportation and supplies to Europe.

Ukrainian geography boasts vast and fertile plains and soil suitable for agriculture, making it a European breadbasket and ensuring food security.

This geography is situated in a transitional zone and acts as a bridge between Russia and Europe. The second subtitle's content goes here.

III. International Standing of Russia and Ukraine in Global Food Indicators:

Both Russia and Ukraine hold important positions in global food indicators, as they contribute to a significant portion of the global trade in strategic food products. Consequently, the ongoing war between the two parties, given their positions in energy and food resources, will inevitably pose challenges and pressures on energy security and food security indicators for many countries worldwide, which will have a general impact on the global economy.

1. Russia's Position in the Global Food Index:

Russia and Ukraine are significant players in the food and fertilizer markets. Russia, in particular, is the world's largest exporter of wheat and the second-largest source of sunflower oil (G.Benton, Froggatt2022, P 05).

It also dominates global fertilizer trade, being the largest source of fertilizers overall, accounting for 14% of global exports. Thus, any fertilizer shortage poses a significant risk to agricultural production worldwide (Republic of Yemen 2022,p07).

Furthermore, Russia is the second-largest source of nitrogen fertilizers and the third-largest source of potassium fertilizers (those containing potassium). Ukraine also holds the same level of importance in the global food markets, being the largest source of sunflowers, the fourth-largest source of corn, and the fifth-largest source of wheat worldwide (G.Benton, Froggatt2022, P 05).

Therefore, if the conflict in Ukraine remains unresolved in the short term, its impact on global resource markets will continue to strengthen. This, in turn, increases the possibility of severe ripple effects on economies and societies worldwide. Previous cases provide an indicator of consecutive risks. Prior to the current crisis, the most dramatic surge in food prices ever recorded occurred in 2010-2011, largely caused by a severe heatwave affecting agriculture in Ukraine and western Russia. Russia also holds significant indicators in the energy sector, being the world's third-largest producer and exporter of oil, the second-largest producer and largest exporter of natural gas, and the third-largest source of coal (thermal and coking).

It is also an important supplier of gases and minerals, especially nickel, palladium, platinum, titanium, as well as aluminum, copper, and uranium (G.Benton, Froggatt2022, P 05).

As a result, the repercussions of the Russian-Ukrainian war on world countries will manifest indirectly through the impact on global food security and energy security, further reinforcing policies of vested interests and entrenchment in one side of this war, which will affect various issues worldwide.

2. Ukraine's Position in the Global Food Index:

Ukraine ranks first in the production and export of essential food commodities that are crucial for many countries, such as sunflower oil, which accounts for approximately half of the global trade at around 40.38%. Its share of global corn exports is 13.4%, and its share of global wheat trade is 5.25% (Hani, 2022,p07).

Ukraine is known as the breadbasket of Europe, exporting about 29% of its food exports to European Union countries. Ukraine is the ninth largest producer of wheat in the world and the fifth largest producer of corn. Agriculture accounts for approximately 10% of the country's gross domestic product (GDP) (Amine and others, 2022,p17). The following table shows the share of Ukraine and Russia in global food trade during 2018-2020.

Table 01: Ukraine and Russia's Share in Global Food Trade 2018-2020.

country	Barley	corn	Sunflower	sun flower oil	Wheat
Russia	14.2%	/	19.6%	23.1%	24.1%
Ukraine	12.6%	15.3%	4.3%	49.6%	10%

Source: Compiled by the researcher based on: JOSEPH GLAUBER, DAVID LABORDE.

Despite the table above indicating the disparity in the share of certain food commodities between Ukraine and Russia, together they constitute a valuable global supply that has an impact on international trade. Both Russia and Ukraine provide 14% of global wheat exports, 19% of global barley supplies, 4% of corn, and they are major suppliers of rapeseed. They also represent 52% of the global sunflower oil export market.

IV. The Implications of the Russian-Ukrainian War on Global Food Security:

The Russian-Ukrainian war has had a negative impact on global food security indicators. This is due to the fact that both countries are major exporters of strategic products that many countries rely on, such as grains and oilseeds. As a result, the ongoing war has caused significant disruptions in global production and food supply chains, leading to increased prices of food commodities in the global market.


1. the impact on food production:

The military operations have created obstacles to the production and movement of Ukrainian agricultural crops within and outside its borders. The destruction of ports, railways, and electronic infrastructure has targeted various essential administrative structures.

Furthermore, the war has led to Ukraine's loss of available stocks within the country due to the extensive destruction. This has resulted in a lack of financial capacity to carry out agriculture in many key agricultural regions. As of July 2022, only 5% (Shubravska, Prokopenko, 2022, p06) of the land was cultivated, compared to 18% previously. This is primarily attributed to insufficient availability of fuel, lubricants, plant protection products, seeds, and fertilizers for farmers, in addition to the destruction of supply chains.

Supply disruptions in the agricultural sector have significantly contributed to a 33% decline in Ukraine's gross domestic product (GDP) between 2022 and 2024 (van Meijl, and others, 2022, p08). Prior to the war, the agricultural sector in Ukraine accounted for approximately 20% of the country's GDP and over 40% of export revenues. (Leal Filho and others, 2023, p03).

Figure (01): Agricultural Sector Damage in Ukraine



Source : RAMZI ALAIDI , BOUDAHA KHALIL ,op,cit.P42

2. the impact on food prices in the global market:

It should be noted that the effects of the Russian-Ukrainian war on food-related fluctuations vary from country to country and region to region, depending on the appropriate local responses to ensure food security for their populations.

However, generally speaking, in terms of global price developments, the international effects of the Russian-Ukrainian war have led to a significant increase in commodity prices. Starting from July 30th, the agricultural price index rose by 34% compared to January 2021.

Similarly, the prices of corn and wheat increased by 47% and 42% respectively, compared to January 2021 (21).

According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), global food prices increased significantly in 2022, especially in March, one month after the Russian attack on Ukraine. Global soybean prices increased by 8.91% in March and continued to rise by about 0.3% and 0.46% in April and May respectively. Corn prices also experienced a higher increase compared to soybeans, rising by 14.66% in March 2022, 3.77% in April 2022, and 0.95% in May 2022. Wheat witnessed the largest price increase among all food products, with prices rising by 24.53% in March, followed by increases of 1.85% in April and 5.45% in May (Nasir and others, 2022, p05).


Table 02: Shows the percentage increase in prices of some food commodities between 2019 and 2022 compared to previous years.

substance	percentage increase in price
Grains	48%
Fuel	86%
fertilizers	35%

Source: Compiled by the researcher based on: JOSEPH GLAUBER, DAVID LABORDE.

It is evident from the table that agricultural commodity prices have risen following the Russian-Ukrainian war between the years 2019 and 2022. This is mainly due to the increase in energy prices, which has a dual impact on the cost of fertilizer production and the cost of processing and transporting food.

The disruption in fertilizer supply chains resulting from the war has affected Ukraine, as well as several countries in Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America, which heavily rely on fertilizer supplies, with Russia being a major global producer of fertilizers.

Figure (02) : Food and Agriculture Organization's Global Food Price Index

Source : FAO Food Price Index

Based on the above figure, we notice that global food prices experienced a gradual increase starting from the beginning of the war, specifically in February 2022, with an increase of 141.2 points, reaching its highest peak one month after the war in March 2022, recording 159.7 points, with an increase of 15.82%. Prices then began a gradual decline from July 2022 with 140.6 points compared to June 2022, showing a decrease of 13.90%. This can primarily be attributed to the agreement between Russia and Ukraine, sponsored by Turkey and the United Nations, regarding the export of grains and fertilizers. This decline in prices slightly continued in the following months until October, reflecting the improvement in production in North America and Russia, as well as the resumption of exports from Black Sea ports in Ukraine.

3. the impact on global food exports:

The Russian-Ukrainian war has had significant ramifications on global food exports, as both countries are major producers and exporters of grains worldwide, representing 12% and 17% of global wheat exports, respectively (Lin, Li, and others, 2023).

Recognizing the importance of these two countries in global grain exports, an agreement was reached between them on July 22, 2022, under the auspices of Turkey and the United Nations, to resume the export of grains and fertilizers. However, disruptions in the supply chain and various logistical operations in grain and oilseed production in both Ukraine and Russia, along with the restrictions imposed on Russian exports due to economic sanctions and Russia's blockade on Ukrainian exports, have had significant repercussions on global food exports.

The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimated early in the crisis that the prolonged disruption of exports from Ukraine and Russia could increase the number of people suffering from food shortages by 8 to 13 million in 2022 (GLAUBER, LABORDE2023, p01.).

3.1.Impact of the war on Ukraine's food exports:

Ukraine's grain exports have declined by more than half since the beginning of September 2023 compared to the same period last year. The Ukrainian Ministry of Agriculture stated that grain exports reached 1.57 million tons between September 1 and 24, 2023, compared to 3.21 million tons during the same period in 2022.

Ukrainian exports were affected by Russia's withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Export Agreement in July of the previous year, which was mediated by the United Nations and Turkey (Al-Jazeera,2024).

Blogger, the website, confirmed that global wheat exports are expected to decrease by 7% in 2023/24. This is largely due to significant portions of Ukrainian agricultural land being occupied by Russia or located in active war zones, which limits production to 35%-40% of pre-war levels. It emphasized that the war has already impacted three agricultural seasons in Ukraine, with its effects being likened to three consecutive major droughts - a deficit from which the country will not quickly recover.

Ukraine exported 1.73 million tons of wheat and 3.45 million tons of corn in December 2023, according to the Black Sea Accord, marking a 34% and 45% increase, respectively, from the previous month. Ukraine's shipments in December serve as an indication of the recovery of its food exports, although they remain below pre-war levels.

Export volumes reached levels higher than almost any other month under the Black Sea Grain initiative, which has now expired due to its non-extension by Russia. Prior to the war, Ukraine used to export up to 6 million tons of corn and wheat combined on a monthly basis (GRO INTELLEGENC, 2024).

3.2. The impact of war on Russia's food exports.

The impact of the war on Russia's food exports: Unlike Ukraine, Russia has capitalized on the war and the blockade of Ukrainian ports to enhance its position as the world's leading source of wheat. The war in Eastern Europe, including the blockade and shelling of ports, has hindered Ukraine's food exports. In contrast, Russian traders have overcome financial and logistical challenges following the invasion and have been able to deliver standard shipments. Russian exports include shipments from areas in Ukraine under Russian control.

These changes have given local powers more control, making it easier for local companies to ship grains grown in the occupied Ukrainian territories and allowing Moscow to influence prices. There are no direct sanctions on Russian agricultural crops, but sanctions on banks have caused financing and logistical problems for grain export companies.

Russia has taken steps to showcase its power by seeking to impose a minimum export price. In June 2023, Moscow sought to establish a minimum price of \$240 per ton, according to informed sources cited by Bloomberg in July of last year (Al-Araby, 2024).

Since the beginning of 2023, Russia has exported food products worth \$43 billion, representing a 14% increase compared to the same period last year. This year, Russian agricultural exports have experienced significant growth despite Western countries' attempts to limit foreign trade recovery. Since the start of the year, Russia has already sold \$43 billion worth of food, a 14% increase compared to the same period last year.

All of this indicates that Russia is maximizing its gains from the decline in Ukrainian food exports to strengthen its position as a major global source of wheat and grains.

V. Conclusion

Based on the aforementioned, it becomes evident that the Russian-Ukrainian war, along with its significance in global food indices, has had negative repercussions on global food production and availability. This is due to the decline in production that both countries have experienced since the outbreak of the war, compared to previous years. Furthermore, the mutual economic sanctions have hindered the global food supply and export movement.

The study emphasizes that despite the economic sanctions, the war's significant impact has affected Ukraine more than Russia, particularly in terms of global food exports. Russia has managed to diversify its exports and take advantage of Ukraine's decline in grain exports to enhance its position in exporting this commodity and others. As a result, Russia has been less affected by the various repercussions of the war on its economy.

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