Anglo-American Diplomacy to Prevent Franco’s Spain from entering the War on the Axis Powers side and to neutralize its Colonial Ambition in North Africa: 1940-1942
Abstract
The Anglo-American apprehension about the Spanish attitude, with respect to the landing in North Africa in 1942, was amply justified. Indeed, the strategic and commending position of Spain over the Straits of Gibraltar made an attack by Franco against the Straits, with German assistance, feasible and likely. If such a move were to take place during the landing operations in Morocco and Algeria, the situation for the expeditionary forces would be disastrous with far reaching consequences. With the likelihood of such prospects, it became necessary to neutralize Spain. The neutralization of Spain was left to the British who had better relations with Spain than the United States. The present article attempts to shed light on the way the British conducted this mild approach in the midst of a totally torn Europe.
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References
F. H. Hinsley, Strategy Hitler’s Cambridge University Press, Cambridge , 1951, p.98
F.O. (Foreign Office) 371/31290, C10783, October 24, 1942, Strang to Mack. The entire F.O. documents hereafter are held in the Public Record Office, London. The Anglo-American landings in North Africa were code-named ‘Operation Torch.’
F.O. 371/31292, C 10816, No. 1637.
F.O. 371/31289, C 10745. In this document S. Hoare uses underrate not underestimate as it came in Michel Howard’s quotation of S. Hoare Grand Strategy, p. 156
F.O. 371/ 31289, C 10755, “Allied Operation in North Africa: Attitude of Spanish Morocco”, September 1, 1942.
Max Gallo, Histoire de l’Espagne franquiste, Laffont, Paris 1969, p. 81
Hinsley , Hitler’s Strategy , op. cit., p. 147
Ibid., p. 147
Gallo, op. cit., p. 117
Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series D, Vol. XI, London, 1961, p. 849
Ibid., p. 1056
Ibid. p. 1143, underlined in text.
Denis Smyth, “Franco and World War Two,” History Today, Vol. 35, London, November 1985, p. 10
------------ “Franco and World War Two,” History Today, Vol. 35, London, Nov1985, p.10
F.O. 371/31289 C, 10745, “Allied Operation in North Africa: Spanish Attitude.” Note by Sir Samuel Hoare, August 29, 1942.
Denis Smith, “The Politics of Asylum, August, Juan Negrin in 1940,”in Diplomacy and Intelligence during the Second World, p.140 War, Richard Langhorne Edi., Cambridge University Press, 1985
Ibid., p. 134
Samuel Hoare (Viscount of Templewood), Ambassador on Special Mission, Collins, London, 1946, pp.108-9 Ruhl K.J., “L’alliance à distance : les relations économiques germano-espagnoles de 1939 à 1945”, revue de d’histoire la deuxième guerre mondiale, Presses Universitaires de France, No. 118, April 1980, Paris, p.85
Howard ,Grand Strategy, op., cit., p. 161
F.R.U.S., Europe, 1941, Vol. II, p. 881
Stanley G. Payne , Politics and the Military in Modern Spain, Stanford University Press, California, 1967, p. 248
F.R.U.S., Europe 1941, p; 88667
Ibid., p. 900
Ibid., p. 909
F.R.U.S., 1942, Vol. III , Europe, p. 250
The American list included: tungsten, tin Lead, zinc concentrates, mercury, fluorspar, olive oil, olives, etc.
Ibid., p.254
F.O. 371/31289, C 10742 “Spanish Claims to Territory in French Morocco.”
Ibid. It should be noted that the British were not prepared to negotiate their sovereignty over Gibraltar, which Spain was claiming.
The Sebou Line ran along the Sebou River which flows south of the then Franco-Spanish border in Morocco
F.O. 371/31290, C 10785, “Torch: Spanish Attitude” Hoare to Anthony Eden, October 13,1942
F.O. 371/ 31290, Gascoigne to F.O. No. 553, October 23, 1942
F.O. 371/31290, A. Eden to P.M., October 19, 1942
Chandler, op. cit., footnote 1, p. 560
F.O. 371/31290, Foreign Office to Tangier, No. 415, October23, 1942
Ibid., The Foreign Office sent a message to S. Hoare to the same effect (F.O. 371/31291, C 10799, No. 1175, October 1942).
F.O. 371/31291, C 10798, “Allied Operations in North Africa, Probable Spanish Action in Morocco,” S. Hoare to F.O., October 19, 1942
F.O. 371/31290, C 10795, Madrid to F.O., October 27, 1942
F.O. 371/31290, C 10795, “Allied Operations in North Africa: Possible Spanish Action in Morocco,” Gascoigne, No. 577, October 29, 1942
Ibid.
F.O. 371/31291, C 10798, Foreign Office to Madrid, November 1, 1942
F.O. 371/31289, August 29, 1942
F.O. 371/31289? C 10777, Brice Lockhart (P.D.) to W. Strang, ‘Propaganda Plan for Spain and Portugal, October 17, 1942
Ibid.
F.O. 371/31289? 10780? W. H. B. Mack to W. Strang, Copy of Telegram from Gen. Marshall to Gen. Eisenhower, October 19, 1942.
Op. Cit., pp. 260-1
Churchill Winston S. Hinge of Fate Cassel and Co. Ltd., London, p. 605
F.R.U.S., 1942, Vol. III. It is worthwhile noting that the text provided by S. Hoare (op. cit., p. 178-9) as being the actual President’s message to Franco is in fact only an early draft of it. This draft was reworded, as suggested by S. Hoare, in the last few days before the landings to constitute the final message of which the British Ambassador was not apparently aware.
F.O. 371/31290, C 10782, “The Contingency of Spanish Hostility.” From Ismay to the Prime Minister.
Howard Michel, Grand Strategy, Vol. IV, London, 1970 p. 163
Ibid., 162-3
F.O. 371/ 31290, Eisenhower to AGWAR, October 28, 1942
F.O. 371/31290, C 10782, “The Contingency of Spanish Hostility.” Ismay to P.M.
Howard, Grand Strategy, op. cit., p. 166
Ibid., p. 166
F.O. 371/31292 C 10813? S. Hoare to F.O., No. 1573, November 8, 1942
F.O. 371/13293 C 10895, S. Hoare to F.O. No. 1596, November 8, 1942
Templewood’s Papers XIII- 22, P.S /42/388, Anthony Eden to S. Hoare, 27th Nov., 1942, Cambridge , University Library.
