North Africa and the Mediterranean in British grand strategy planning for the opening of the second front in 1942
Abstract
Contrary to the thesis developed by Michael Howard in his book The Mediterranean Strategy in the Second World War, which states that Great Britain had no pre-planned strategy for the Mediterranean, this country had from the very beginning of the war, started to evolve a consistent approach in which the control of North Africa and the Mediterranean was a central priority for waging the future war in Europe. This article attempts to show how Winston Churchill, the British Prime Minister and his Chiefs of Staff had developed their war strategy for the Mediterranean andNorth Africa and how they manoeuvred with their American counterparts to make of this area the only possible option for a second front in 1942.
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References
Cunningham of Hyndhope, A Sailor 's Odyssey, Hutchinson and Co. London, 1951 P. 245
Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill 1939-1941, Heineman, London, p. 631
Paul Farmer, Vichy: Political Dilemma, Columbia University Press, N.Y., 1956 p. 193
Jean Lacouture De Gaulle, le rebelle 1890-1944, Seuil, Paris, 1984, p. 454
Winston S. Churchill The Grand Strategy, Cassel and Co. Ltd. London, 1950, p.539
Ibid. p. 541. The second paper, completed after the British party had landed advocated that the Allies should aim at recovering naval superiority in the Pacific by May 1942. The third paper entitled "The Campaign of 1943" based on the assumption that part one of the Prime Minister's strategy would succeed, advocated a mass invasion of Europe in 1943.
Churchill op., cit., Vol. II P. 585
F.O. 371/31909 France, file No. 25? The Prime Minister Cable of 24/12/41 to the War Cabinet and the Chiefs of Staff Committee. The Azores, Madeira, and The Canary Islands were most likely targets for the Axis.
Francis L. Loewenheim et al. Roosevelt and Churchill, their Secret Wartime Correspondence, Barrie and Jenkins, London, p.173
F.O. 371/32905
Matloff M. and Snell E. Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, Washington D.C Department of the Army, 1953, p. 104
Francis L. Loewenheim et al. op. cit. f.n. 2 p. 218
In early June 1942 Vice Admiral Louis Mountbatten was sent to Washington to explain to the Americans that given the small number of landing crafts that would be available for 'Sledgehammer' the scope of the operation would be insignificant; it would not be much trouble for the Germans who had enough forces in France (25 divisions). Thus the British rejected' Sledgehammer' and questioned the feasibility of 'Round-Up' in 1943.
Harouni Brahim, "The Defeat of France in 1940 and the American approach to Northwest Africa: a strategy for the Defence of the Western Hemisphere" Expressions, May 1993, pp. 84-5
Air 41: 33, C.O.S ((42) 65th Meeting (0) 10 July 1942, p. 8
Ibid. Prime Minister's Personal Telegrams T. 967:2 No. 108 p. 8
B.J.S.M.293 2231 2/8 until July, 1942, Admiral Andrew Cunningham was naval Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean
Gordon A. Harrison, Cross Channel Attack Office of Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Washington D.C., 1951 p.29
Funck Arthur Layton , The Politics of Torch, the University of Kansas Lawrence, 1974, p. 84
The Memorandum from President Roosevelt to General Marshall is given in Churchill The Hinge of Fate Cassel and Co. Ltd., London, 1951, p. 398-400
Matloff and Snell op. cit., p. 282
Air 41/33 p. 9
Funk, op. cit., p. 84
W.O. 106/5203, J.P.(42) 669(0) July 13, 1942
Sherwood Robert E., The White House Papers of L. Hopkins, Vol. I, Eyre and Spottiswood, London, 1949, p. 615
Michael, Howard The Mediterranean Strategy in the Second World War, London, 1968
